



PAX-NIGERIANA AND NIGERIA'S CONFLICT MANAGEMENT IN AFRICA IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY

Sunday Omotuyi^{1*}

¹Departments of International Relations, Obafemi Awolowo University, Ile-Ife, Nigeria

*Corresponding author: omotuyis@oauife.edu.ng

Received: 17 February 2020 • Accepted: 28 February 2020 • Published: 30 April 2020

Abstract

Nigeria's advocacy for the 'African solutions to African problems' has been a critical component of its African diplomacy since its independence in 1960. This advocacy finds its loudest expression in the leadership roles it played in peacekeeping and peace-building efforts in the continent in tandem with what has been dubbed Pax-Nigeriana. However, less than a decade since returning to democratic governance in 1999, Nigeria's commitment to the peacekeeping efforts has been waning. In spite of its globally acknowledged regional security provider, Nigeria's interventions in a number of regional countries leave much to be desired. This study, therefore, argues that the plethora of domestic security challenges in Nigeria has had dire implications for conflict management in Africa. The study, which relies on personal observation and secondary sources, contends that Nigeria's declining commitment to its self-assigned 'responsibility to protect' in Africa as vividly demonstrated in Mali's operation and other contexts portend bleak future for the effective peacekeeping operations in the continent. The paper concludes by recommending that domestic issues such as terrorism and inequality in the polity among others must be addressed if Nigeria wants to continue playing its traditional leadership role in West Africa especially in the security sector.

Keywords: *African security, African solutions to African problems, conflict management, Pax-Nigeriana, responsibility to protect*

Cite as: Omotuyi, S. (2020). Pax-Nigeriana and Nigeria's Conflict Management in Africa in The Twenty-First Century. *Asian People Journal*, 3(1), 186-200.

INTRODUCTION

After many years of laudable conflict management efforts across Africa as a critical component of *Pax-Nigeriana* (or Nigerian Peace), especially in the Post-Cold War era, Nigeria surprisingly pulled out from the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stability Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) in 2015 (Warner, 2015; Wyss, 2017). Two

years earlier, the government had announced its decision to recall Nigerian military contingents from the United Nations-African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) in Sudan (*Reuters*, 2013) against the agreed timeline. Prior to this time, Nigeria's commitment to the peace-building mission in Africa had suffered some setback. In 2007, Abuja pledged to provide military contingents and police to the operation to degrade *al-Shabbab* terrorist organization in Somalia under the umbrella of African Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). While it only deployed 15 policemen, it could not redeem its pledge of mobilizing soldiers for the operation in the crisis-wracked country (*BBC News*, 2007; World Peace Foundation nd; Hull and Svensson 2008). Due to the structural weakness of many African states which accounts for the frequency of conflicts as well as the uninspiring performance of African troops in northern Mali (2012-2015), African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crises (ACIRC) was established to intervene in any state in the continent where state collapse is likely (Warner, 2015).

Through its early warning signal, egregious human rights abuses which often accompany state collapse would be effectively pre-empted (Warner, 2017). However, in spite of the continent-wide approval of the new security framework, Nigeria declined to support it on the pretext that the formation of ACIRC amounts to the duplication of existing security outfit, the largely moribund African Standby Force (ASF) (Warner, 2017). These four scenarios appear to be suggestive of abdication of the critical component (peacekeeping activity) in Nigeria's Afro-centric foreign policy. Corroborating the yawning gap in Nigeria's African leadership, the incumbent Nigerian President, Muhammadu Buhari admitted to the declining Nigeria's influence and clout in West Africa specifically. In an address at the prestigious Policy Think Tank, Chatham House in London, just before the 2015 Presidential election that returned him as an elected President, he told his audience that ... "If am elected President,...Nigeria will return to its stabilizing role in West Africa" (Tukur, 2015). Since his election, Nigeria has not only failed to return to this historic responsibility, it has also become a major destabilizing factor in the Chad Basin region.

Basically, this growing negative phenomenon in Nigeria's African diplomacy is in sharp contrast to its well-known conflict management efforts in the continent (Olonisakin, 2012; Adebajo, 2010; Obi, 2009; Babatunde and Okeke-Uzodike, 2015; Ojaborotu and Adeleye, 2017). In fact, in the early years of the 21st Century during the regime of President Olusegun Obasanjo, Nigeria's potency in conflict mediations in Sao Tome and Principe and Republic of Togo were well-known (Oshewolo, 2017). Peacekeeping operations under the platform of the United Nations have been central to the Nigerian foreign affairs. As Bakare (2018: 2) has remarked, "...peacekeeping and conflict resolution have become the major instruments of Nigeria's foreign policy thrust". In the immediate Post-Cold War period when African states were left to their own devices by Great Powers, Nigeria, as part of efforts to pre-empt state collapse and to project power in the continent, started shouldering the burden of conflict management under the umbrella of 'responsibility to protect' principle (Adebajo 2010). For example, Nigeria's advocacy for the "African solution to African problems," compelled Abuja to instigate the formation of crises management outfit; ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) to restore stability in the war-torn states in West Africa (Obi, 2009). In all, Nigeria has contributed more than 200,000 thousand troops to peace-building in the continent, making it the largest troop contributors to the UN-approved operations (Gambari 1997; Ojaborotu and Adeleke 2017). Unfortunately, such an eminent position has been lost to Ethiopia in recent years (*UN News*, 2012).

In the 21st century, conflict management in Africa appears to be less critical in Nigeria's foreign relations as the four scenarios earlier mentioned have shown. While some scholars have blamed Nigerian reluctance to intervene forcefully to resolve crises in the region on the dwindling financial fortune of the country in the light of the plummeting oil prices globally, this study offers a more nuanced perspective for Nigeria's recent lack of activism in the peacekeeping mission. For example, Bakare (2019) rationalizes Nigeria's reluctance to intervene in the Malian crisis of 2012 on its previous experience in the Liberian Civil War; an intervention that cost the country enormous funds to execute. Certainly, financial capability is important in conflict management, but the prevailing condition in the country is far more complex than mere economic doldrums which is deflating Nigeria's influence

in the continent. This study, therefore, interrogates the multiple forces undermining Nigeria's capability to remain committed to its traditional peacekeeping mission anchored on *Pax-Nigeriana*. The paper's central argument is that the plethora of security challenges which include terrorism, armed banditry, secessionism and the menace of the violent Fulani herdsmen have had negative ramifications for Nigeria's conflict management in Africa.

Today, both the Nigerian Army and the government have formally declared that Nigeria is in war situation (Olatunji and Akintola, 2019). Therefore, more men and officers of the Nigerian Army are needed for the Joint Task Force (JTF) operation in the north-east to combat terrorism of Boko Haram, and for operations 'Python Dance' to confront the secessionist Biafran movements and 'Pulo Shield' to secure the nation's oil wealth in South-east and South-South respectively. Current Nigeria's external relations primarily focuses on resolving internal issues rather than focusing on a commitment to peacekeeping missions in the continent. This paper, therefore, contends that Nigeria's reluctance to remain committed to its self-assigned responsibility in Africa portends a bleak future for the effective conflict management in the continent. To achieve the goals of the study, the paper is divided into four interrelated parts. The first section discusses the overview of the Nigerian peacekeeping efforts since independence in the context of its *Pax-Nigeriana*. The second segment investigates the internal security crises that have undermined Nigeria's commitment to conflict management in the continent. The third part examines the Nigerian responses to the Malian debacle under the umbrellas of AFISMA and MINUSMA. The last segment tries to predict the future of conflict management in Africa in the light of Nigeria's diminished capability and France's deepening interventions in African affairs.

Pax-Nigeriana and Nigeria's Responsibility to Protect in Africa

Since the Nigerian independence in 1960, particularly after the end of the Cold War, Abuja has intensified its leadership quest in Africa by playing prominent roles in the continent especially in the economic and security sectors. In West Africa sub-region specifically, Nigeria's conflict management leadership is well-known. Its bid to play a pivotal leadership role in peacekeeping and peace-building activities in the continent can be situated within the context of 'the responsibility to protect policy'. This globally acknowledged doctrine asserts that the comity of nations has a responsibility to protect vulnerable persons if the constituted state authorities are unwilling or unable to do so (Adebajo 2010; Deutscher 2005). Echoing the UN's core tenet of responsibility to protect, Paris (2014, 270) argues that while 'every state has a responsibility to protect its citizens from mass atrocities, 'this responsibility may fall to the broader international community should peaceful means be inadequate and national authorities manifestly fail to protect their populations from genocide, war crime, ethnic cleansing and crime against humanity'. In its pursuit of African leadership as an aspiring regional hegemon, Nigeria demonstrated what Adebajo (2010) labels as "missionary zeal" in assuming the role of a benevolent 'older brother's' responsibility for protecting younger siblings, that is, fellow African states. It has been the hope and aspiration of Nigeria to advance the cause and yearnings of African persons (Kupchan and Kupchan, 1995).

Basically, in the early post-colonial history of Africa, conversations around the formation of the collective security mechanism through the so-called *Pax-Africana* (or African peace) were very popular. Articulated by the African foremost scholar, Ali Mazrui in 1967 who advocated for an African peace that is protected and maintained by Africa herself (Mazrui 1967), however, the cliché found its best expression in Nigeria's *Pax-Nigeriana*. Like *Pax-Africana*, *Pax-Nigeriana* ultimately seeks to Africanise conflict management in the continent and spare the region of extra-African powers especially France from meddling in the continent's affairs unduly (Adebajo 2010). According to Mazrui, external interventions in African affairs are considered illegitimate and therefore unjustified, whereas, interventions by African states are largely regarded as more legitimate than those foreign entities (Mazrui 1967). *Pax-Nigeriana* is an ambitious Nigeria's regional agenda to play a dominant leadership role in critical areas of the continent such as political, economy and security sectors. The successive Nigerian leaders have, in varying degrees, expressed strong belief in Nigeria's exhibiting what Nnamdi Azikwe styled as Nigeria's 'manifest destiny

and historic mission' to assume special responsibility as a regional leader (Azikwe 1961). Speaking on the Nigerian continental leadership, President Shehu Shagari, noted that; just as President Monroe proclaimed the American hemisphere free from the military incursions of Europe, so also do we in Nigeria and Africa, insist that African affairs be left to Africans to settle (Jobson, 2014).

Nigeria's benign *Pax-Nigeriana*, unlike the United States' *Pax-Americana* which allegedly fosters imperialism, does not involve expansionism or irredentism as its weak neighbours had feared (Akinyemi 1970; Obadare 2001). Indeed, when the large segment of the Nigerian public urged the government to annex the neighbouring Island of Fernando Po, the Prime Minister Tafawa Balewa refrained from embarking on such a controversial policy (Akinyemi 1970). In other words, *Pax-Nigeriana* has not posed any form of threat to the sovereign authorities of Nigeria's immediate neighbours. Achieving peace and stability which are *sine qua non* to the much-desired economic development is the arrow-head of Nigeria's *Pax-Nigeriana*. Devised by a consummate scholar, Professor Bolaji Akinyemi who served as the Nigerian Minister of External Affairs in the 1980s to provide a rationale for Nigeria's continental leadership (Warner, 2017), *Pax-Nigeriana* has ever since become central to Nigeria's foreign relations.

Indeed, the Nigerian Afrocentric foreign policy in the Post-Cold War international system is engineered in the pursuit of a *Pax-Nigeriana* within West Africa specifically and Africa broadly. This guiding principle represents Abuja's ambition at playing a peacekeeping leadership role among others and "not an adventure for a greater Nigeria" (Adebajo 2010: 131). Convinced of the centrality of *Pax-Nigeriana* in engendering regional development, Akinyemi, launched a diplomatic attempt in the 80s to attain what he dubbed Middle Power status for Nigeria in international political affairs and subsequently started advocating for a sort of 'Monroe Doctrine' that would spare West African from all forms of external military interventions (Bach 2007). Indeed, Nigeria's so-called hegemonic leadership in the continent is more often than not advanced by its conflict resolution activities in Africa. Since the disengagement of the British colonialists from its body politic in 1960, Nigeria has contributed hundreds of thousands of troops to peacekeeping missions around the world (Gambari 1992; Gambari 1997; Adebajo, 2010; Ojakorotu and Adeleke 2017). *Pax-Nigeriana* finds its best expression in this important sector in the Nigerian continental leadership. Buoyed by its enormous oil wealth, Nigerian military capability enabled it to enforce peace where necessary and demonstrate a commitment to a cause generally perceived to be mutually helpful to the regional states.

No other place has Nigeria's *Pax-Nigeriana* be forcefully demonstrated than the West African sub-region. Although primarily formed in 1975 to promote sub-regional economic integration for the overall development of the sub-region, Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), played a pioneering peacekeeping operation in Africa. Its crises management role hinged on the 'responsibility to protect' was mainly made possible by two important issues. First, the withdrawal of the Great Powers, especially the United States from the continent shortly after the Cold War, gave more impetus to the advocacy for 'African solutions to African problems,' especially in the security sector. In Liberia, where ECOWAS, through ECOMOG first experimented with peacekeeping operation in the community was not unconnected with the United States' indifference to the political debacle in the country. While the establishment and development of the country was the brain-child of Washington, however, the political turmoil that plunged the country into a needless 'Hobbesian State of nature' in the 1990s did not necessitate the intervention of the United States. After its successful evacuation of American nationals from Monrovia, Washington left the troubled country to its devices (Sesay 1996). Its surprising abdication of responsibility in Liberia left a yawning leadership vacuum in the country that desperately needed to be filled.

Secondly, the appalling humanitarian crisis in Liberia spurred by the civil war provided the needed opportunity for Nigeria to experiment with its *Pax-Nigeriana* based on the 'African solution to African problems'.

Although the conflict management effort was mounted in Liberia under a multilateral arrangement, Nigeria played a central role in the initiative. As Reno (2012) has remarked, Nigeria's willingness to shoulder the cost of the peacekeeping force was pivotal to the success of the framework in the 1990s. Indeed, Nigeria's military power, economic support, as well as political, greatly helped in galvanizing regional countries to restore peace and stability to Liberia in spite of the inadequate pan-African support. In fact, Adebajo (2010: 424) pointed out that: "Nigeria provided at least 75 percent of the troops and about 90 percent of the funding for both ECOMOG interventions in Liberia. It supplied the only contingents whose withdrawal would have ended the mission." The applause received by the ECOMOG by actors at continental and global levels encouraged the framers of the security framework to intervene in Sierra Leonean conflict.

Nigeria's conflict management missions across West Africa in the early 1990s were primarily tailored "to build long term political and economic stability in West Africa, as well as to fulfill a historical sense of a regional responsibility as a regional 'big brother' to protect younger siblings" (Adebajo 2010: 422-423). Had Nigeria refused to spearhead the initiative, the deleterious impacts of the conflicts in Liberia and Sierra Leone would have not only resulted in the state collapse but also reverberated across West Africa. Therefore, the interventions were mainly designed to ameliorate humanitarian tragedies suffered in both countries and protect the ECOWAS citizens. Within continental Africa, until in recent years, Nigeria was the largest troop contributor to the United Nations' peacekeeping efforts in the region. So critical to the Nigerian foreign policy thrusts is conflict management in Africa that analysts believe the nation has the needed credentials to represent Africa in the planned restructuring of the UN Security Council to accommodate other important regional powers (Adeniji 2005). According to Gambari (1997), Nigeria's participation in the UN peacekeeping operations and peace observers' missions are a demonstration of the country's capacity for preventive diplomacy and post-conflict peace-building in Africa. Of the truth, Nigeria's acknowledged crisis resolution credentials as a key supporter of UN agenda at restoring order and stability has certainly projected the country as an important stakeholder in the peace and stability of the international community. Its commitment to the ideals of this global body highlights the burden of responsibility Nigeria was prepared to bear as a dependable member of the institution.

Internal Security Crisis and Nigeria's Abdication of Conflict Management in Africa

Nigeria's commitment to the principle of responsibility to protect through its conflict management activities in Africa has been acknowledged and lauded by actors at regional and international levels (*UN News*, 2018). It was therefore surprising and disappointing when Abuja unilaterally withdrew from the UN-led MINUSMA operation to degrade the coterie of Islamist militants in Mali in 2015 (Warner, 2015). Abuja also recalled its troops from Sudan's Darfur operation (*Reuters* 2013). More importantly, after lauding the South African-sponsored ACIRC, Nigeria made a volte-face, declining to commit itself to the agenda of the regional security mechanism under the pretext that the security initiative is duplicative of the existing ASF (Warner 2017). These scenarios are certainly in contrast to Nigeria's traditional advocacy for African Peace which found its loudest expression in *Pax-Nigeriana*. Although reasons have been advanced for Nigeria's disengagement from MINUSMA and its reluctance to support ACIRC, these seem insufficient as explanations for Nigeria's recent lack of enthusiasm and activism for peacekeeping operations around the continent. It is apposite, therefore, to interrogate the rationale behind the Nigerian abdication of its so-called manifest destiny and historic mission in African states.

In sharp contrast to the expectations of most Nigerians, the disengagement of the military from the Nigerian body politic in 1999 paving the way for democratic governance in the country failed abysmally to engender the so-called dividends of democracy for the generality of the people. The recent history of the post-military administration in Nigeria is disappointingly riddled with a high level of insecurity, corruption and poverty. In its almost six decades of existence, Nigeria has never experienced the multiple sources of security threats threatening to cripple the African giant. Unfortunately, the entire security architecture has not left any keen observers of the Nigerian

democratic environment in doubt of its inability to address this security conundrum. For more than a decade, the jihadist Boko Haram terrorist group has remained unrelenting in terrorizing the northeastern part of the country. Despite the multiple claims of 'technical defeat' of the Islamist group by the government (Onapajo 2017), Boko Haram and its factional group, Islamic State West African Province (ISWAP) remain deeply entrenched in the region making life hellish for the residents. The group's inflexible determination to establish a new theocratic Nigeria devoid of Western education and influence but strictly governed by Sharia legal code has resulted in the death of tens of thousands of people in Nigeria in particular and Lake Chad riparian states of Chad, Cameroon and Niger in general (Onuoha 2015). Moreover, the Boko Haram uprising has precipitated horrendous humanitarian tragedy in the affected regions as millions of people are displaced within and outside the country.

The ceaseless vicious attacks perpetrated by the Fulani herdsmen against the local dwellers mainly Christian farmers in the north-central as well as the menace of the armed bandits which has in recent times metamorphosed into kidnapping for ransom has further exacerbated the delicate religious and ethnic fault lines in the country. This is largely so because the menace of the herders is seen as a renewed agenda of the Fulani to acquire more lands (Oluwole 2019). Indeed, polarizing statements credited to some Fulani supremacists and elder statesmen were not helpful in resolving the conflict. For example, Professor Umar Labdo Muhammed, once justified the land-grabbing attitude of the Fulani herders. According to him 'the Fulani have a legitimate claim to the ownership of the Benue (the frontline state in the conflict) by virtue of 'right of conquest' (Opejobi 2018). Also, the former Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo and Nobel Prize winner Professor Wole Soyinka blamed the ceaseless crisis on the 'Fulanisation' and 'Islamisation' mission of Fulani to subjugate Nigeria and Islamise West Africa (*Punch* 2019). The so-called farmer-herdsmen conflicts have resulted in the displacement of persons from their ancestral lands while the 'conquered lands' were appropriated and renamed by the herders (Nanlong, 2018). Therefore the relentless assaults on the local farming population in the affected states in the beleaguered zone have produced a record number of internally displaced persons (IDPs) camps.

In Benue state alone, the State Emergency Management Agency (SEMA) reports that 483, 699 displaced by herdsmen attacks in the states (*Sahara Reporters* 2019). So devastating were the attacks perpetrated by these killer herdsmen that the Global Terrorism Index (GTI) ranked the group as the fourth deadliest terrorist group in 2015 (Buchanan, nd). The crisis is worsening given the inability of the government to de-escalate the crisis. In fact, the Nigerian government has encouraged the farmers to release the lands for grazing zones because 'being alive is better than ancestral attachment to land' (*Vanguard*, 2018). Similarly, the unrelenting menace of the armed bandits in Zamfara, Sokoto, Katsina, Kaduna and some other northern states has further aggravated insecurity in the region, worsening the fragility of the Nigerian states. In fact, in the last five years, Nigeria continues to register poorly on most failed state indicator lists, ranking in 2019 as the world's 14th most failed state (Fund for Peace, 2019) falling well behind the average of tropical African country over which it intends to exercise leadership. The military is completely helpless as it has not been able to proffer lasting solutions to the problems of terrorism of Boko Haram, herdsmen and farmers clashes and lately, armed banditry in the country. Indeed, the bandits' attacks have become worrisome that the affected state governments have resolved to give amnesty for prosecution and financial package to the repentant bandits in exchange for stoppage of unlawful killings (Nseyen 2019; *Sahara Reporters* 2019). Apart from rustling cattle and stealing other valuables from their victims, armed banditry has become a big criminal enterprise as the bandits now kidnap individuals for ransom payment (Yahaya, 2019).

More importantly, the resurgence of agitation for a separate state of Biafran Republic by the Igbo people of the South-east has continued to have implications for the national security. The military has had to launch different kinds of military operations to quell the rebellion. To address the unusual security problems, the Nigerian Army has embarked on the Operation Positive Identification nation-wide to fish out criminals and maintain internal security and order in the country (Amaize 2019). In other words, the military has taken over the primary

responsibility of maintaining internal order by the Nigerian police force. However, in spite of the militarization of the Nigerian society, chronic insecurity problems persist in the country. Today, Nigeria is among the first five countries in Africa with the highest number of displaced persons induced by the violence perpetrated by Boko Haram and 'killer herdsmen' (Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, 2019). Indeed, in the past few years, insecurity challenge in the country has become the primary focus of Nigeria's external relations (Onuoha 2015), undermining Abuja's commitment to its African diplomacy of which *Pax-Nigeriana* is a critical component of.

The peace and security enjoyed by Nigeria after the end of the Nigerian Civil War in 1970 and the economic boom that followed largely propelled by oil rents, made the country a sort of oasis of stability in West Africa. It, for instance, enabled Nigeria to offer sanctuary to political exiles and persons fleeing from conflicts in their countries. But in the post-democratic transition environment, Nigeria has become an important source of regional instability as the threat poses by the Boko Haram, in particular, threatens regional peace and stability (Onuoha 2015). The apparent failure of the government to put an end to the security crises in the country has not only put a bold question mark on its regional hegemonic leadership claim but also affected its national image abroad. For instance, in a bid to degrade the Boko Haram terrorism, the government has had to embark on the expulsion of 'aliens' mostly from the contiguous states of Chad, Niger and Cameroon for allegedly aiding Boko Haram violence in the country (Ntaryike 2012; Zenn 2013). The policy further worsened relations between Nigeria and these Francophone states. Also, the decision dealt a devastating blow to the credibility of *Pax-Nigeriana* which has been the basis of its commitment to the ECOWAS' free movement of persons across West Africa. In other words, the expulsion was an attack on Abuja's principle of protecting fellow Africans that has been critical to the country's external relations since 1960.

Basically, most apparent Nigeria's international role is conflict management in Africa, forming and helping to form various institutions and alliances to respond to political and security crises in the continent. In West Africa; the primary area in its external relations, Nigeria spearheaded the formation of various groupings such as ECOMOG, Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC), Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) and AFISMA among others to facilitate the stability and peace in the region. Indeed, the centrality of peacekeeping activities in Nigeria's external relations has become a basis for Abuja's quest for membership in the proposed enlargement of UN Security Council (Gambari 1992; Gambari 1997; Adeniji 2015). Indeed, in comparison with other regional contenders, Nigeria is deemed to be ahead of them because it has proved effective in discharging its international obligations in the critical areas of peacekeeping and peace-enforcement – two key areas in which the Security Council had been very prominent (Gambari, 1997). UN itself has oftentimes praised Nigeria's commitment to the most fundamental ideals of the global body (*UN News* 2018). In recent years, however, Nigeria appears to have abdicated its peacekeeping responsibility in Africa to mainly concentrate military efforts on the internal issues in the country. Abuja's responses to the conflict zones in the continent, as well as its reaction to an initiative to address these challenges, are indications that Abuja no longer prioritizes conflict management in its foreign policy. Nigeria's lethargic response to the Malian operation through AFISMA/MINUSMA and its refusal to commit itself to the ideals of the ACIRC raises important poser about the continued relevance of Nigeria's 'responsibility to protect principle in Africa' in the 21st century.

Formed with a mandate to flush out Islamic militants and al Qaeda elements which had paralysed political institution in Mali, AFISMA's disappointing outing and Nigeria's eventual withdrawal from the UN-led MINUSMA opens a new sad chapter in Africa-led crisis resolution in Africa. In 2012, in the context of the worsening security challenge in Mali especially after the terrorists belonging to the dreaded al Qaeda in the land of Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) got involved in the crisis, Doncounda Traore, the interim President of Mali, called for an ECOWAS intervention (Ahmed 2012). In response, ECOWAS with African Union' (AU) support called on the UN Security Council to formally authorize an African-led military intervention in Mali (Wyss 2017). However, despite

the authorization of the Security Council of what later became known as AFISMA (*Le Monde* 12 November. 2012), the deployment of the new security framework against the terrorists did not take off on time (*Jeune Afrique* 24 December 2012). The delay in the deployment of AFISMA was largely not unconnected with the reluctance of Nigeria; the regional leader, to commit itself to the operation, especially in terms of men's financial resources. By the time it eventually took off, the operation was bedevilled with inadequate financial resources and military capability needed for the reconquest of the northern part of the country where the terrorists had imposed their rule. AFISMA's logistical trouble was compounded by the unwillingness of the UN to provide much-needed funds and logistical support (Vines, 2013; Weiss and Welz 2014). The apparent failure of Nigeria to play a leadership role in Mali's operation highlights the growing worthlessness of the advocacy for 'African solutions to African problems' which Abuja has been championing through its responsibility to protect mantra.

Until the intervention of an extra-African power; France in the country, AFISMA was completely unable to take on the Islamic jihadist groups comprising Ansar Dine, the Movement for Unity and Jihad and AQIM. Paris' military campaign against the militants was lauded by the Malian populations as well as the international community. In fact, African troops in AFISMA relied heavily on French material and air support to participate actively in the operation. (Carayol 2013). The eventual UN direct intervention in the security conundrum in which the global body through the UN (MINUSMA) assumed the leadership of the operation incorporated what remained of AFISMA on 1 July 2013 (UN 25 April 2013). A disturbing twist was added to the operation when in July 2015, Nigeria unilaterally withdrew its military contingents from the operation (Wyss, 2017). Indeed, the withdrawal marked the first time in its enviable history of conflict management across the continent that Nigeria would disengage from peacekeeping operations under the UN platform.

The withdrawal generated a lot of controversies as some observers argued that the decision was a sort of protest against embarrassment meted out against Nigeria by the UN. The global body had named a Rwandan army General as the MINUSMA's force commander instead of a Nigerian General who headed AFISMA while it lasted (Kane, 2013). However, it was widely believed that the withdrawal from Mali's operation was triggered by the desperate need to address the internal security crisis ignited by the Boko Haram terrorism (Warner 2017). The clearest clarification behind the Nigerian decision was offered by General David Mark who was the Senate President at the time. The former lawmaker argues that the planned withdrawal was prompted by the brutal activities of the Boko Haram terrorist group back at home (Nda-Isaiah, 2014). According to the former military administrator, "The activities of Boko Haram insurgents had compelled the government to withdraw its peacekeeping troops from Mali" (Nda-Isaiah, 2014). In the same way, Cote D' Ivoire's President, Mr. Alassane Ouattara, who was the Head of ECOWAS at the time asserted that Nigeria decided to withdraw its troops from Mali because they "were needed at home to tackle militant Islamists" (*BBC* 2013).

Nigeria, as well as ECOWAS, is admittedly interested in sub-regional peace and stability. However, the uninspiring performance of ECOWAS in Mali particularly in the light of Nigeria's disengagement from the operation is important for two main fundamental issues. In the first instance, as the operation has clearly shown, future effective management of conflicts in the sub-region would be largely dependent on the operational support from foreign powers notably, France. Meanwhile, France's new African policy on conflict management championed by the President, Mr. Francois Hollande was aimed mainly to Africanise peacekeeping activities in the region by supporting African-led solutions to African crises (Hollande 2012). This would, in his assessment, invariably avoid a direct involvement of French troops in African conflicts and pre-empt accusation of neo-colonialism (Wyss 2017). His successor, President Nicolas Sarkozy equally expressed his support for the new policy on Africa (Wyss 2017). However, Mali's operation was an eye-opener to the growing ineffectiveness of ECOWAS to mount a successful peacekeeping mission in the region. Admittedly, France's response in Mali which overwhelmed the terrorists only came in response to African lackluster outing. Despite the ECOWAS and France's

preference for an African solution to African crises, as articulated by African foremost scholar, Ali Mazrui, it was wholly French intervention and not the regional efforts that restored stability in Mali. The intervention dealt a blow to the Mazrui's advocacy for a peace that is protected and maintained by Africa herself (Mazrui 1967).

Secondly, the failed ECOWAS project in Mali had unintended consequences for Franco-African relations. Abandonment of its Africanisation and multilateralisation of conflict management in Africa has fuelled the accusation of French neo-colonial aspirations that the Hollande's policy wanted to pre-empt. French renewed foray into Africa is largely viewed as part of a new political phenomenon: 'new scramble' mainly for African resources (Aljazeera 2014; Carmody 2011). Basically, Paris' interventions in African affairs are driven by a desire to maintain its *domaine reserve* in the unstable region rather than an altruistic commitment to the conflict management agenda (Omole 2010). The Malian operation has helped to deepen and strengthen France's military footprint in West Africa by reasserting its traditional security role in West Africa in contrast to its Africanisation agenda. Essentially, Nigeria's inability to demonstrate a commitment to its *Pax-Nigeriana* in Mali was fundamental to the re-assertiveness of Paris in West African political and security affairs.

As a result of the failure of African troops in Mali, which provided a rationale for second France's unilateral intervention in Mali in January 2013 through what it code-named 'Operation *Serval*' (Boeke and Schuurman 2015), ACIRC security initiative was proposed. The new continental security framework was not only tasked with the responsibility to prevent state collapse and nib in the bud egregious human rights abuses in war-torn states in Africa, but it was also meant to limit France's military incursion in Africa by taking ownership of the crisis management activities in the continent (Warner 2017). Indeed, operation *Serval* in the Malian crisis was an embarrassment not only for ECOWAS but also for AU and member states. Therefore, the initiative was applauded by Nigeria when it was first muted (Warner 2015). However, as the domestic security problems notably, Boko Haram violence became more threatening, it withdrew its support to the framework.

While it officially justified its decision to withhold the much-needed support to the ACIRC on the question of duplication of the largely moribund African Standby Force (ASF), it appears Nigeria's decision is connected to the prevailing security issue in the country. As Esmenjaud (2014: 176) has observed: "Nigeria could be reluctant to commit its troops and equipment in other contexts when it needs them to combat its own domestic Boko Haram insurgency." Abuja's lack of interest in ACIRC is, therefore, better understood in the context of its traditional peacekeeping mission, thinking that it might one day be asked to assume the leadership of the ACIRC, bearing the financial and logistical burden of the security outfit (Du Plessis 2014).

Nigeria and the Future of Conflict Management in Africa

Admittedly, in the 21st century, it is increasingly becoming glaring that African states lack the financial resources and political will to finance their respective regional security frameworks (Ambrosetti and Esmenjaud 2014). Different peacekeeping activities embarked on by the African states in recent years have been largely uninspiring. By its recent actions, it would appear Nigeria has ultimately ceded conflict management to France after many years of diplomatic maneuverings to limit the interventions and influence of the European power in West Africa. However, would France's abandonment of its Africanisation and multilateralisation of conflict Management mechanism in the light of the diminished capacity of Africa broadly and Nigeria's waning clout specifically facilitate peacekeeping operations in the sub-region? Response to this question demands an interrogation of the French unique interests in the continent generally and West Africa especially.

France's interventions in the sub-region are far more complex than what usually appears as an effort aimed at facilitating stability and order in the region (Wyss 2015). An amalgam of factors rather than a commitment to regional peace and security is crucial in understanding Paris's involvement in African affairs. In the first instance,

Francophone states in West and Central Africa are considered in the French foreign policy circle as a *domaine reserve* that every power must steer clear off (Omole, 2010). As a key military power in the sub-regions based on the different defense treaties concluded with these French-speaking states at the dawn of independence as well as France's aspiration of grandeur, there was a sense of responsibility pushing Paris to get involved in African issues (Marchal 2013; Chafer 2014).

Secondly, and this is closely related to the first factor, is the economic interest of France in Africa as well as the need to protect its partners in the region. Apart from being one of the largest trading partners with these countries, the protection of these economic and strategic interests is of utmost importance to France. For example, the uranium mining industry in the Niger Republic is under the effective control of France and can go to any length to protect it. It has to be therefore, recognized that French interventions over the years have been essentially driven by a desire to maintain its influence, to protect its friendly regimes and aggrandize its selfish economic interests in West Africa. While in some cases France's involvement has actually helped to pre-empt total state collapse and prevented egregious human rights abuses by the Islamic militants, it is debatable whether the logic of its forceful intervention is conducive to long term stability in Africa. It would be very difficult for France to intervene directly in security crises in any of the non-francophone states in West Africa since its interest are limited in the concerned Anglophone or Lusophone states. It has not, for example, intervened forcefully in Nigeria to combat the terrorism of Boko Haram the way it did in Chad, Cameroon and Niger where its troops are on the ground. In the foreseeable future, France's expected interventions in the region would likely be influenced by the character of an individual crisis, the international context and more importantly, the unique interests of Paris.

For years, especially after the end of the Cold War, Nigerian hegemonic clout in West Africa was instrumental in facilitating peace and stability of the region. It is, however, doubtful, given the prevailing domestic security threats, whether Nigeria would remain a key peacekeeping nation. Today, Nigeria is in dire need of the international effort similar to the US-led coalition that defeated Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in the Middle East to battle terrorism and militancy in the country. Indeed, the Presidency has demanded from the Egyptian government to help call on the international community against Boko Haram crisis in the country (*Sahara Reporters* 2019). In the context of Nigeria's growing incapability to shoulder the costs of the peacekeeping operation in the region, undertaking effective conflict management in the region by an African effort would be very difficult.

In the absence of the capable regional hegemon to guarantee stability in West Africa, the likelihood of more prolonged crises in the foreseeable future cannot be ruled out. As Guinea Bissau and Malian conflicts have shown, it would be hard for ECOWAS to mount a successful peacekeeping operation in the region without Nigeria's commitment. In Guinea Bissau for example, troops contributed by the quartet of Benin, Niger, Gambia and Togo to mediate peace in 1999, had to be hastily withdrawn from the crisis-torn state less than five months after they were deployed (Luntumbe 2013: 14-15). The operation was launched without Nigerian involvement. The unsuccessful ECOMOG intervention in the country showed the indispensability of Nigeria to the regional peacekeeping (AU Commission 2003).

More importantly, it clearly demonstrated that the success of any major conflict management activity in the region would depend largely on Nigeria. Unfortunately, Nigeria is no longer in a vantage position to play such a critical role in mediating peace in the region as issues relating to internal security take primacy over international conflict management in its external relations. Given the nature of conflicts in West Africa as well as the divergence interests of the regional powers, it appears increasingly that neither France nor Nigeria would be able to guarantee stability and security in the volatile region.

CONCLUSION

In this study, we argue that the growing disinterest in the regional conflict management by Nigeria speaks volumes of the domestic security challenges the country is contending with. The pulling out from Malian peacekeeping effort and well as Nigeria's refusal to voice its support to the ACIRC security initiative represents a new sad development in Nigeria's Afro-centric diplomacy which was conceived with a view to attaining peace and order in the continent. It was in the light of this that Nigeria played crucial leadership roles in peacekeeping and peace-building efforts in the continent in tandem with what was later termed *Pax-Nigeriana*, championing the advocacy for 'African solutions to African problems'. While it is incontrovertible that Nigeria's leadership role in conflict resolution was not primarily focused on merely advancing its hegemonic aspirations but to genuinely facilitate peace and stability in the region, the plethora of internal security challenges are undermining this responsibility.

The seemingly intractable terrorism of Boko Haram, rampant kidnapping cases for ransom, increasing armed banditry, the renewed secessionist bid of Biafran groups and the menace of the violent herdsmen have had dismal implications for Nigeria's foreign relations especially in the area of conflict resolution. The government has officially affirmed that Nigeria is currently in a war situation (Olatunji and Akintola 2019) given the escalating brutal criminal activities in the country. Therefore, combatting these domestic security problems is expectedly given priority over peacekeeping responsibility in the continent.

The abandonment of France's Africanisation and multilateralisation of the peacekeeping complexes in the continent is not unconnected with the apparent lack of regional power with necessary political will, military capability and financial resources to shoulder the costs of conflict management in West Africa specifically. However, it has to be recognized that Paris's continued interventions in any state in the sub-region would be largely determined by the degree of convergence between the intervener and the concerned state. Its interventions would be seriously constrained where interests have diverged, in such a situation, the affected states would be left to their devices.

The abdication of Nigeria's age-long 'responsibility to protect' principle would not only have consequences for its quest for membership of the UN Security Council but would also further complicate efforts at proffering lasting solution to the continent political and security challenges. For Nigeria to remain committed to *Pax-Nigeriana* by advancing its responsibility to protect principle, countering effectively the terror activities of Boko Haram, killer Fulani herdsmen, kidnapping syndicate and other criminally-minded groups certainly requires a paradigm shift. The military approach, which the government seems to have prioritised in the fight against crime necessarily needs to be redesigned to accommodate input from the local groups for the much-needed intelligence.

Arbitrary arrests and summary executions of the suspected members of the criminal gangs without judicial pronouncement are counter-productive to the success of the military operation as the real criminals are often offered protection by the traumatised locals. Therefore, in formulating an effective counter-terror strategy, the government should ensure that military strategy must address social malcontent and extreme poverty in the affected region, especially in the north-east. This is because various studies indicate that these twin issues, as well as corruption, are the root cause of insecurity in the country. A determined effort by the government to eliminate corruption, unemployment, obstacles to democratic governance, high disparities of income, social injustice and environmental degradation would certainly go a long way in addressing the current crises Nigeria is contending with. A more peaceful, stable and democratically ordered Nigeria would incentivize the nation to play a leadership role in conflict management in 21st century Africa.

REFERENCES

- Adebajo, A. (2010), Pax-Nigeriana and the Responsibility to Protect, *Global Responsibility to Protect*, 2(4), 414-435.
- Adeniji, A. (2005), Power and Representation at the United Nations: A Critique of Nigeria's Bid for Permanent Seat in the Security Council, *India Quarterly*, 61(2), 116-137.
- Ahmed, B. (2012), Reconquête du Nord-Mali: l'armée se réarme et peaufine ses plans avec la Cedeao, *Jeune Afrique*, 15 August.
- Akinyemi, B. (1970), Nigeria and Fernando Poo, 1958-1966: The Politics of Irredentism, *African Affairs*, 69(276), 236-249.
- Aljazeera (2014), The New Scramble for Africa, 27 July, (19 September 2018). online: <https://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/empire/newscrambleforafrica/2014/07/new-scramble-africa-2014723203324932466.html>
- Amaize, E, et al. 2019. Uproar, as Army Insists on 'Operation Identify Yourself,' *Vanguard* 1 October, 2019, (08 November 2019). online: <https://www.vanguardngr.com/2019/11/uproar-as-army-insists-on-operation-identify-yourself/>
- Ambrosetti, D. and Esmenjaud, R. (2014), "Whose Money Funds African Peace Operations? Negotiating Influence and Autonomy with External Partners." In *Peacekeeping in Africa: The Evolving Security Architecture*, edited by T. Tardy and M. Wyss, 73–89. Abingdon: Routledge.
- AU Commission (2003), *Policy Framework for the Establishment of the African Standby Force and Military Staff Committee*.
- Azikiwe, N. (1961), *Zik: A Selection from the Speeches of Nnamdi Azikwe*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Babatunde, O., and Okeke-Uzodike, U. (2015), Nigeria, Afrocentrism, and Conflict Resolution: After Five Decades – How Far, How Well? *Africa Studies Quarterly*, 15(4), 1-24.
- Bach, D. (2007), Nigeria's 'Manifest Destiny' in West Africa: Dominance without Power, *Africa Spectrum*, 42(2), 301-321.
- Bakare, O. (2019), The Nigerian-Commonwealth and UN Relations: Nigeria, From Pariah State to Exporter of Democracy since 1999. *Cogent Social Sciences*, 5, 1-13.
- BBC News. (2007), Peacekeeping Protests in Somalia, 9 February, online: [newsbbc.co.uk/2/hi/Africa/6347809.stm](https://www.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/Africa/6347809.stm) (22 October 2019).
- BBC News. (2013), Nigeria 'to withdraw some troops from Mali, 19 July, online: <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-Africa-23369865> (04 May 2018).
- Boeke, S. and Schuurman, B. (2015), Operation 'Serval': A Strategic Analysis of the French Intervention in Mali, 2013-2014. *Journal of Strategic Studies*, 38(6), 801-825.
- Buchanan, TR. nd. Global Terrorism Index: Nigerian Fulani Militants named as Fourth Deadliest Terror group in World, *Independent*, (16 September 2019). online: <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/global-terrorism-index-nigeria-fulani-militants-names-as-fourth-deadliest-terror-group-in-world-a6739851.html>.
- Carayol, R. (2013), "Mali: pourquoi la Misma se hâte...lentement." *Jeune Afrique*, 25 January.
- Carmody, Pádraig (2011), *The New Scramble for Africa*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Chafer, T. (2014), Hollande and Africa Policy, *Modern & Contemporary France*, 22(4), 513–531.
- Deutscher, M. (200), The Responsibility to Protect. *Medicine, Conflict and Survival*, 21(1), 28-34.
- Du Plessis, C. (2014), S A Wins—and Loses—on African Stand-by Force, *City Press*.
- Esmenjaud, R. (2014), The African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crisis: Conceptual Breakthrough or Anti-Imperialist Phantom? *African Security Review*, 23(2), 172–177.

- Fund for Peace. (2019). Fragile State Index 2019, (13 November 2019). online: <https://fundforpeace.org/tag/fragile-states-index-2019/>
- Gambari, I. (1990), The Role of the United Nations in a Changing World Order, Lagos, NIIA Lecture Series No.73.
- Gambari, I. (1997), Reform of the United Nations and Nigeria's Quest for a Permanent Seat in the UN Security Council, Lagos: NIIA Founder's Day Lecture, December.
- Hollande, F. (2012), Discours du Président de la République française François Hollande devant l'Assemblée nationale sénégalaise, le 12 octobre 2012." *Jeune Afrique*, 15 October, (18 September 2019). online: <http://www.jeuneafrique.com/Article/ARTJAWEB20121012115858/>
- Hull, C., and S, E. (2008), African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM): Exemplifying African Union Peacekeeping Challenges Swedish Defence Research Agency, Stockholm, (13 November 2019).online: <https://www.foi.se/rest-api/report/FOI-R--2596--SE>
- Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (2019), Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) data as of May 2019, (30 September 2019). online: www.internal-displacement.org/global-report/grid2019/
- Jeune Afrique*. (2012), Nord-Mali: la force africaine déployée au premier semestre 2013?, 24 December, (08 July 2019). online: <http://www.jeuneafrique.com/Article/ARTJAWEB20121224111451/>
- Jobson, E. (2014), AU Summit: Conflicts to Overshadow Economic Theme. *Financial Mail*, 31 January, (26 August 2018). online: <http://www.financialmail.co.za/features/2014/01/30/au-summit-conflicts-to-overshadow-economic-theme>
- Kane, M. (2013), Nigeria pulls out of MINUSMA: Protest or Prioritisation of Domestic Security? Institute for Security Studies, 15 November, (accessed 28 September 2019). Online: <https://issafrica.org/iss-today/nigeria-pulls-out-of-minusma-protest-or-prioritisation-of-domestic-security/>
- Kupchan, C. and Kupchan, C. (1995), The Promise of Collective Security. *International Security*, 20(1), 52-66.
- Le Monde Afrique*. (2012), A Abuja, la Cédéao esquisse une intervention militaire au nord du Mali, 12 November, Luntumbe, Mu. (2013), *Le Nigéria dans la géopolitique ouest-africaine: atouts et défis d'une puissance émergente. Note d'Analyse*. Bruxelles: GRIP, 18 juillet.
- Marchal, R. (2013), Military (Mis)Adventures in Mali. *African Affairs*, 112(448), 486–497.
- Mazrui, A. (1967), *Toward a Pax Africana: A Study of Ideology and Ambition*, London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson.
- Nanlong, M. (2018), Plateau Shocker: Herdsmen Rename Communities Grabbed from the Indigenes. *Vanguard* 30 June, (17 April 2018). online: <https://www.vanguardngr.com/2018/06/plateau-shocker-herdsmen-rename-communities-grabbed-indigenes/>
- Nseyen, N. (2019), IGP, Buhari Govt under Fire for Negotiating with Bandits, Funding Herdsmen with ₦100bn, *Daily Post* 20 September, (23 September 2019). online: <https://dailypost.ng/2019/09/20/igp-buhari-govt-fire-negotiating-bandits-funding-herdsmen-n100bn/>
- Ntaryike, D. (2012), After Border Shutdown, Nigeria Expelling Cameroonians, others, *Cameroon Post*, February 7, (09 May 2018). online: www.cameroonpostline.com/after-bordershutdown-nigeria-expelling-cameroonians-others/
- Obadare, E. (2001), Constructing Pax Nigeriana? The Media and the Conflict in Nigeria-Equatorial Guinea Relations, *Nordic Journal of African Studies*, 10(1), 80-89.
- Obi, C.I (2009), Economic Community of West African states on the Ground: Comparing Peacekeeping in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea Bissau, and Cote D'Ivoire. *African Security*, 2(2-3), 119-135.
- Ojakorotu, V. and Adeleke, A. (2017), Nigeria and Conflict Resolution in the Sub-region West Africa: The Quest for a Regional Hegemon? *Insight on Africa*, 10(1), 37-53.
- Olatunji, S.J. and Akintola, K. (2019), We are in War Situation in Nigeria – Reps, Nigerian Army. *Tribune* 31 October, (03 November 2019). online: <https://www.tribuneonlineng.com>
- Olonisakin, F. (2008), *Peacekeeping in Sierra Leone: The story of UNAMSIL*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.
- Oluwole, J. (2019), Afenifere Echoes Obsanjo's Fulanisation Allegation, says Herdsmen's Onslaught Deliberate, Willful. *Premium Times* 27 May, (13 September 2019). online: <https://premiumtimesng.com/region/ssouth->

west/332003-afenifere-echoes-obasanjos-fulanisation-allegation-says-herdsmen-onslaught-deleberate-willful.html

- Omole, B. (2010), *Nigeria, France and the Francophone States: The Joy, Anguish of a Regional Power*, Inaugural Lecture Series 226, Obafemi Awolowo Press.
- Onapajo, H. (2017), Has Nigeria Defeated Boko Haram? An Appraisal of the Counter-terrorism Approach under the Buhari Administration. *Strategic Analysis*, 41(1), 61–73.
- Onuoha, F. (2015), A Danger not to Nigeria alone: Boko Haram's Transnational Reach and Regional Response, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Peace and Security Series (FES) Abuja.
- Opejobi, S. (2018), Benue Belongs to Fulani Herdsmen by Right of Conquest – Prof. Muhammad. *Daily Post* 18 January, (04 February 2019). online: <https://dailypost.ng/2018/01/18/benue-belongs-fulani-herdsmen-right-conquest-prof-muhammad/>
- Oshewolo, S. (2017), Nigeria's Peace Intervention in Sao Tome and Principe and the Republic of Togo under President Olusegun Obasanjo, *African Identities*, 16(4), 383-395.
- Paris, R. (2014), The 'Responsibility to Protect' and the structural Problems of Preventive Humanitarian Intervention, *International Peacekeeping*, 21(5), 569-603.
- Punch*. (2019), Islamism Terrorism: Obasanjo, Soyinka on Point, *Punch Editorial*, 24 May, (11 July 2019). online: <https://punchng.com/islamist-terrorism-obasanjo-soyinka-on-point/>
- Reno, W. (2012), The Regionalization of African Security, *Current History*, 111(745), 175–180.
- Reuters*. (2013), Nigeria to pull many Peacekeepers from Mali, Darfur, 19 July, (18 June 2018). online: <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-nigeria-un-mali/nigeria-to-pull-many-peacekeepers-from-mali-darfur-idUSBRE9610PA20130719>
- Sahara Reporters*. (2019), HURIWA Slams Zamfara Governor for Negotiating with Bandits, 11 August, (13 September 2019). online: saharareporters.com/2019/08/11/huriwa-slams-zamfara-governor-negotiating-bandits
- Sahara Reporters*. (2019), SEMA: 483,699 IDPs affected by Herdsmen Attacks in Benue State, 26 January, (21 May 2019). www.saharareporters.com/2019/01/26/sema-483699-idps-affected-herdsmen-attacks-benue-state
- Sahara Reporters*. (2019). Osinbajo demanded Egypt to help call on the World against Boko, Haram, 28 October, (13 September 27 2019). online: <http://saharareporters.com/2019/10/28/join-us-calling-world-take-action-against-boko-haram-osinbajo-tells-egypt/>
- Sesay, AM. (1996), Civil War and Collective Intervention in Liberia, *Review of the African Economy*, 23(67), 35-52.
- Tukur, S. (2015), I will Restore Nigeria's lost Glory, Buhari says at Chatham House, Premium Times February 26, (11 February 2020). www.premiumtimesng.com/news/top-news/177561-i-will-restore-nigerias-lost-glory-buhari-says-at-chatham-house.html
- UN (2013), UN Security Council Resolution 2100, 25 April, (11 March 2018). un.org/press/en/2013/sc10987.doc.htm
- UN News. (2012), Ethiopia: A Leading Contributor to UN Peacekeeping Efforts, Global Perspective Human Stories, (28 September 2018). online: <https://news.un.org/en/gallery/529832>
- UN News. (2018), Service and Sacrifice: Honouring Nigeria's Contribution to UN Peacekeeping. Peace and Security, 16 February, online: <https://news.un.org/en/story/2018/02/1002901>
- Vines, A. (2013), A decade of African Peace and Security Architecture, *International Affairs*, 89, 1, 89–109.
- Warner, J. (2015), Complements or Competitors? The African Standby Force, the African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crises and the Future of Rapid Reaction Forces in Africa, *African Security*, 8, 56–73.
- Warner, J. (2017), Nigeria and "Illusory Hegemony" in Foreign and Security Policymaking: Pax-Nigeriana and the Challenges of Boko Haram, *Foreign Policy Analysis*, 13, 638-66.
- Weiss, T. and Welz, M. (2014), The UN and the African Union in Mali and Beyond: A Shotgun Wedding? *International Affairs*, 90(4), 889–905.

- World Peace Foundation. nd. African Politics, African Peace, (03 October 2019). online: <https://sites.tufts.edu/wpf/files/2017/Somalia-brief.pdf>
- Wyss, M. (2017), France and the Economic Community of West African States: Peacekeeping Partnership in Theory and Practice, *Journal of Contemporary African Studies*, 1-19.
- Yahaya, N. (2019), How Nigeria and its President are being held to Ransom, *BBC News* 29 May, (19 July 2019). online: <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-48435964>
- Zenn, J. (2013), BH's International Connections, *Combating Terrorism Center*, 6, 1, (12 May 2018). online: <https://ctc.usma.edu/boko-harams-international-connections/>